docker/egress/v1.1.4

Wan-Video/Wan2.2docker/egress/v1.1.4Jul 12, 2026by Pangjiping

AI Summary

Egress component release featuring significant security hardening for Credential Vault and breaking changes to network enforcement.

Key Highlights

  • Credential Vault requires dns+nft enforcement
  • Path traversal rejection before credential injection
  • Credential Vault placeholder substitutions

Breaking Changes

  • Credential Vault requires dns+nft enforcement
  • X-Forwarded-Proto no longer trusted from arbitrary peers
  • Match.Ports removed from Credential Vault bindings

New Features

  • Credential Vault placeholder substitutions
  • CredentialSource provider interface
  • Fallback to native nft for DNS redirect

Full Release Notes

## What's New

### ⚠️ Breaking Changes

- **Credential Vault requires `dns+nft` enforcement.** Credential-bound destinations can no longer be reached via direct-IP connections that bypass DNS. Deployments using DNS-only enforcement must migrate to `mode = "dns+nft"` in the `[egress]` config. `defaultAction: allow` still works but is deprecated for Credential Vault (emits a security warning); `defaultAction: deny` with explicit allow rules is recommended. (#1136)

- **`X-Forwarded-Proto` no longer trusted from arbitrary peers.** Only trusted from IPs/CIDRs listed in `OPENSANDBOX_EGRESS_CREDENTIAL_VAULT_TRUSTED_PROXY_CIDRS`. Client-supplied forwarded headers are stripped and rebuilt from the observed connection. Deployments that terminate TLS in front of the egress sidecar must configure the trusted proxy CIDRs, otherwise Credential Vault will reject requests as non-HTTPS. (#1138)

- **`Match.Ports` removed from Credential Vault bindings.** Port is now derived from scheme (`http`→80, `https`→443) — the only ports the intercept layer redirects. Remove the `ports` field from existing binding configs; SDK models regenerated. (#1189)

### 🔒 Security

- **Path traversal rejected before credential injection.** When a vault is active, requests with raw `../`, percent-encoded dot-segments (`%2e%2e`, mixed-case), or encoded path separators (`%2f`) now return 403 before binding match, preventing credential-scope escape via ambiguous paths. Legitimate clients resolve dot-segments before sending, so this is a strong evasion signal. When no vault is active, requests pass through unchanged. (#1192)

### ✨ Features

- **Credential Vault placeholder substitutions.** Opt-in placeholder substitution for `path`, `query`, `header`, and `body` surfaces (including `passthrough` auth bindings), with request-side encoding rules and placeholder/value redaction. API contract, SDK models, docs, and e2e coverage updated. (#1251)

### 🐛 Bug Fixes

- **Fallback to native `nft` for DNS redirect.** In some K8s pod netns, `iptables-nft` can list the `nat` table but fails on `nat OUTPUT` append (`RULE_APPEND failed`), causing the egress sidecar to crashloop. Now falls back to native `nft` DNS redirect rules, retries setup without dropping the table when it doesn't exist yet, and uses a plain `drop` for the default-deny fallback. (#1146)

### 🔧 Improvements

- **OTel metrics normalized.** Attribute keys `.` → `_` (`http_method`, `http_status_code`, `routing_result`) and OTLP export switched to **delta temporality**. Update dashboards/alerts accordingly. (#1209)

- **`CredentialSource` provider interface.** Credential source resolution now goes through a `CredentialSource` interface + `SourceRegistry`, enabling future secret manager integrations (HashiCorp Vault, AWS SM, etc.) without touching wire format or SDK models. (#1186)

### 📦 Misc

- **GHCR image publishing.** egress images now also published to `ghcr.io`. (#1161)

## 👥 Contributors

Thanks to these contributors ❤️

- @bcho
- @cwj2001
- @hellomypastor
- @jwx0925
- @Pangjiping

---
- Docker Hub: opensandbox/egress:v1.1.4
- Aliyun Registry: sandbox-registry.cn-zhangjiakou.cr.aliyuncs.com/opensandbox/egress:v1.1.4
- GHCR: ghcr.io/opensandbox-group/opensandbox/egress:v1.1.4