v6.13.7
invoke-ai/InvokeAIv6.13.7Jul 21, 2026by lstein
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AI Summary
A security patch release addressing a vulnerability that allowed attackers to recover sensitive configuration files containing API keys and download tokens.
Key Highlights
- Fix for sensitive file leakage (invokeai.yaml, api_keys.yaml)
- Fix for model path leakage
- Fix for arbitrary path existence testing
- Fixed administrator functions available to regular users in multiuser mode
Full Release Notes
# InvokeAI Version 6.13.7 ## ā ļø This is a security patch release All recent versions of InvokeAI through 6.13.6 contain a security hole that potentially allows an attacker to recover the contents of the running instance's `invokeai.yaml` and `api_keys.yaml` files. These files can contain sensitive data including API keys for image generation hosting services and API download tokens for HuggingFace and other model download sites. *Your keys/tokens may have been compromised if:* 1) Your `invokeai.yaml` file contains download API tokens for any model provider (e.g. Civitai, HuggingFace), 2) Your `api_keys.yaml` file contains API keys for one or more remote image generation services (e.g. Alibaba, OpenAI), 3) At any point, you set the listen host to `0.0.0.0` to enable network access to your InvokeAI machine, and 4) Either you exposed the InvokeAI machine to the Internet, or you share your LAN with untrusted individuals. In the event that these apply to you, or just to be safe, please upgrade to version 6.13.7 and rotate your API tokens and keys. š **Note:** The InvokeAI team discourages opening your InvokeAI host to the internet. If you choose to do so, we recommend that 1) you use the multiuser configuration and pick strong passwords; and 2) that you isolate the InvokeAI instance in a Docker container. š ## Additional security fixes This patch also closes a series of related but less critical security issues: * **Leakage of model paths:** An attacker could recursively enumerate the paths of all models and model-like files, in an arbitrary directory on the Invoke server's filesystem. * **Testing existence of arbitrary paths:** An attacker could also determine whether a certain file is present on the Invoke server's filesystem, even if it wasn't a model file. * **Administrator functions available to regular users:** In multiuser mode, several functions intended for the use of Administrator users were available for use by unprivileged users. Not an obvious security hole, but a potential problem. Many thanks to George Chen (@geo-chen), for reporting the original issue. **Full Changelog**: https://github.com/invoke-ai/InvokeAI/compare/v6.13.6...v6.13.7
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