v0.2.0
t8y2/dbxv0.2.0Jun 22, 2026by mukul975
AI Summary
This is a major feature release introducing a new `triage_cve` orchestrator for concurrent CVE risk assessment and significant security hardening measures. It adds new data sources like VulnCheck and HIBP, improves scoring logic with CISA KEV overrides, and enhances infrastructure with multi-stage Docker builds and SQLite WAL support.
Key Highlights
- New `triage_cve` orchestrator for concurrent risk assessment with SSVC v2 support.
- Security hardening including SSRF defense and removal of sampling handlers.
- Integration of new data sources: VulnCheck, CIRCL, and HIBP Pwned Passwords.
- Infrastructure improvements with a multi-stage non-root Dockerfile and SQLite WAL.
New Features
- New `triage_cve` orchestrator with concurrent fan-out and composite risk scoring.
- VulnCheck NVD++ fallback for NIST NVD unreachability or throttling.
- CIRCL hashlookup and HIBP Pwned Passwords range API integration.
- New MCP resources (kev://catalog, epss://scores) and prompts (patch_decision, compare_and_prioritize).
- Streamable-HTTP transport support via `MCP_TRANSPORT=http`.
- CISA KEV hard override logic (Critical severity clamping).
Full Release Notes
## CVE MCP Server v0.2.0
A major feature release. **Additive** — all existing tools remain registered; the new `triage_cve` orchestrator is the recommended entry point.
### ⭐ Orchestration
- **`triage_cve`** — one tool call fans out NVD + EPSS + CISA KEV (+ public PoC discovery) concurrently, computes the composite risk score, and returns a clean report. `depth` = `quick` / `standard` / `deep`; **`deep`** also emits an SSVC v2 gated decision (CISA Deployer model → `Act` / `Attend` / `Track*` / `Track`).
- Transparent **VulnCheck NVD++ fallback** used automatically when NIST NVD is unreachable or throttled.
### 🎯 Scoring
- **CISA KEV hard override** — a KEV-listed CVE is always **CRITICAL** (score clamped ≥ 76), regardless of CVSS/EPSS.
- **`scoring_version`** stamped into `triage_cve`, `calculate_risk_score`, and `health_check`.
- CVSS reframed as a **severity** signal (not exploitation-likelihood), per Allodi & Massacci 2014.
### 🔌 New data sources
- **VulnCheck NVD++** (NVD-schema fallback), **CIRCL hashlookup** (known-good allowlist), **HIBP Pwned Passwords** range API (keyless k-anonymity).
### 🧩 MCP enhancements
- **Resources**: `kev://catalog`, `epss://scores/{cve_id}`, `manifest://tool-hash` (SHA-256 over the registered tool surface).
- **Prompts**: `patch_decision`, `compare_and_prioritize`, `dependency_triage`.
- **Streamable-HTTP transport** via `MCP_TRANSPORT=http` (stdio remains the default).
- Expanded `health_check` (scoring version, manifest hash, configured-key status).
### 🔐 Security hardening
- Server **never** registers a sampling handler / never issues `sampling/createMessage` (Unit 42 MCP-sampling attack vector).
- **SSRF** defense: scheme allowlist + resolve-then-validate (rejects private/reserved IPs).
- Secrets centralized as Pydantic `SecretStr`.
### 🏗️ Infrastructure
- Multi-stage non-root **Dockerfile** + `.dockerignore`.
- SQLite **WAL** pragmas for concurrent reads; null-object rate limiter; fixed-interval deterministic retry; async fan-out helper; static Admiralty source-trust table.
**Verified:** ruff clean, 30/30 tests passing.
**Full Changelog:** https://github.com/mukul975/cve-mcp-server/compare/v0.1.0...v0.2.0
## What's Changed
* fix(7): set correct default values for cache and audit by @fergoid in https://github.com/mukul975/cve-mcp-server/pull/8
## New Contributors
* @fergoid made their first contribution in https://github.com/mukul975/cve-mcp-server/pull/8
**Full Changelog**: https://github.com/mukul975/cve-mcp-server/compare/v0.1.0...v0.2.0